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DOES TALK MATTER AFTER ALL?
INFLATION TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK BEHAVIOR
Kenneth N. Kuttner
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
and
Adam S. Posen
Institute for International Economics
Since 1990, a number of economies — including Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel,
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom — have adopted inflation targeting
as their declared monetary strategy. It had been explicitly discussed by the European
Monetary Institute, as well, as one of the two candidate strategies for the European Central
Bank’s future monetary framework [EMI (1995), p. 4], although recent statements by the
ECB President would seem to imply that it may not be chosen. Contemporaneous with
this development, an academic literature on inflation targeting has arisen, led by the
contributions of Svensson (1997a, 1997b, Svensson and Faust 1998)1. In this literature,
inflation targeting is treated as the latest and perhaps best candidate strategy for resolving
the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, following on the work of Rogoff
(1985) and of Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993).
Yet, to many observers, it is not entirely clear how inflation targeting in practice
serves the purpose asserted for it in theory. If inflation targeting simply consists of the
central bank (or the controlling government) announcing its inflation goal — the p* in the
familiar rules-versus-discretion models following Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983) — it either is providing the private sector with information already
presumed to be known in these models, or it is making a less than credible claim (in the2
sense of actions not talk defining weak versus strong types as in Cukierman and Meltzer
[1986]). If inflation targeting is instead a commitment that the central bank will target
only inflation without regard for other goals — the characterization given in Friedman and
Kuttner (1996) and in various countries’ political discussions — it is merely a limiting-
case for the Rogoffian conservative central banker rather than a new type of monetary
strategy, let alone a welfare-improving one.
The matching of model and operational practice is made more complicated by the
institutional patterns which have emerged amongst inflation targeting central banks. As
described in Mishkin and Posen (1997) and in Bernanke, et al (1999), a largely consistent
operational form has been adopted by all inflation targeting central banks implying a
convergence on best practice. This operational form does begin with the public
declaration of a numerical goal for inflation over a specified time-frame, but it does not
end there. It also always includes a number of other elements, notably regular publication
of an Inflation Report-type document explaining the sources of inflationary pressures in
the economy as well as careful design and detailed public description of the target
inflation series and range. Moreover, every inflation targeting central bank exhibits
flexibility in response to economic shocks (whether or not granted formal “escape
clauses”) and gradualism in the pursuit of their inflation goals (see the case studies in
Bernanke, et al (1998) for details).
What, then, actually is inflation targeting? Does the central bank talk and
institutional aspects associated with it serve a purpose, or is it solely verbal window
dressing? If inflation targeting is instead merely a shift in preferences, can this be
consistent with the apparently measured rather than crusading pursuit of low inflation by
inflation targeting central banks? This paper identifies five different possible2 While there is a growing empirical literature on inflation targeting, most studies,
such as Ammer and Freeman (1995), Laubach and Posen (1997), and Johnson (1997) have
examined inflation outcomes. Almeida and Goodhart (1997) is one study that explicitly
considers central bank behavior.
3 Research in progress will add comparisons to non-inflation target adopting
countries during the same period.
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interpretations of inflation targeting consistent with various strands present in the current
literature. The existence of so many viable interpretations of inflation targeting may
indicate that current academic discussions — and policy regimes — have taken the effects
of this new monetary regime on central bank behavior for granted.2
The interpretation of King (1997) — that inflation targeting mimics the optimal
state contingent rule precisely because the institutionalization of central bank talk enhances
accountability — is one way of resolving the conundrum. The interpretations that
inflation targeting represents a move towards greater counter-inflationary conservatism
either by adopting central banks or as part of a worldwide preference shift, or that
inflation targeting is actually inflation-only targeting, have very different implications for
central bank behavior. Two further interpretations require distinguishing between the
various inflation targeting adopting central banks — that increased central bank discussion
of goals is a sign of weakness (as in Garfinkel and Oh [1995]), or that such talk only
matters when tied to explicit contracts for central bankers complete with punishments (as
in some interpretations of Walsh [1995] as applied to New Zealand). The implications of
these for the behavior of monetary instruments and inflation expectations in the 1990s in a
sample of three inflation targeting adopting (Canada, New Zealand, and United Kingdom)
countries are used to examine the effects of inflation targeting on central bank behavior.3
Part I builds on the simple models of King (1997) and Svensson (1997a), to derive
the implications for central bank behavior and inflation expectations of each interpretation4 Examples of this latter group include Svensson (1995), Ball (1997), and Cecchetti
(1998).
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of inflation targeting. Part 2 discusses which countries’ experiences may be realistically
identified with each interpretation, drawing on the historical-institutional work in Mishkin
and Posen (1997) and Bernanke, et al, (1999). Part 3 examines the hypothesized shifts in
central bank behavior empirically, both in terms of the time-series behavior of inflation,
and the impact of inflation surprises on long and short interest rates after adoption. Part 4
concludes that inflation targeting should be seen largely as a shift from more discretionary
policy towards the optimal state contingent rule, although the inclusion of more strict
contracting on the central bank can also make inflation targeting mimic an increase in
anti-inflationary conservatism.
1. A Modelling Framework for Inflation Targeting
Models of monetary policy generally fall into one of two camps: those descended from
Barro-Gordon (1983), which take expectations formation as the core problem; and those
analyzing monetary policy’s optimal control problem neglecting expectations formation.4
The purpose of our investigation is not just to determine whether inflation targeting
constitutes a regime shift, but whether the communication efforts that typically accompany
an inflation targeting regime “matter”, in the sense that they predictably affect the
behavior of the central bank and expectations of that behavior. Consequently, our
modelling approach falls into the first of these two camps. In particular, we draw on the
Svensson (1997a), and King (1997) extensions of the basic Barro-Gordon framework.
The problem of monetary policy in both classes of models is to manage aggregate
demand in a way to minimize the deviation of output and inflation from their targets.5 Interesting complications are introduced when the CB’s preferences aren’t known,
but must be inferred by the public. Examples include Backus and Driffill (1985),
Garfinkel and Oh (1995), Svensson and Faust (1998).
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Formally, the central bank is assumed to have a quadratic loss function in each period of
the form:
where p is the inflation rate and y can be interpreted as the output gap. We assume
(without loss of generality) that the target rate of inflation is zero. For whatever reason,
however, the CB may try to maintain output above potential; in this case, the target output
gap, y* would be greater than zero. The l parameter represents the CB’s weight on output
stabilization vis à vis inflation; a value of zero indicates the CB cares only about inflation.
The CB’s preferences (i.e., the value of l) are known to the public.5
Output obeys a Lucas-style aggregate supply relation,
in which higher-than-expected inflation is associated with increases in output. This feature
gives the CB an incentive to mislead the public with regard to its inflation objective in an
attempt to create a “surprise” and increase output; consequently, absent a commitment
mechanism, low inflation policies are typically not time consistent. The e shock, as usual,
is interpreted as a supply-side disturbance. Persistence is introduced through the inclusion
of an autoregressive term, ryt–1.
We assume that private-sector inflation expectations are formed rationally before
the e disturbance is realized, so that pt
e = Et–1pt. The CB can observe e in real time,
however, and sets policy contingent on its realization. This key assumption means the CB
can play a constructive role in stabilization: when there is an adverse disturbance (a6
negative e realization), the CB's optimal policy is to partially offset its effects on output
by generating an inflation surprise. As shown by Rogoff (1985), appointing a
conservative (lower l than that of society’s median voter) central banker, reduces the
inflation bias, but results in more volatile output. King’s (1997) “optimal state-contingent
rule” (OSCR) is superior to that outcome, as discussed below, if only the central bank can
be sufficiently trusted to pursue it.
Central banks obviously don’t set the inflation rate directly, however. Instead, they
manage aggregate demand through the appropriate choice of interest rates. To model this,
we assume aggregate demand is a simple function of the ex ante short-term real interest
rate,
where d <0 ,a n dr* is the real rate consistent with a zero output gap. Conditional on
period t expectations of period t+1 inflation, the CB chooses the nominal short-term
interest rate i1,t consistent with the real rate that will yield the desired combination of
output and inflation. This is tantamount to choosing pt, of course, but this additional layer
at least allows us to analyze the behavior of interest rates.
With output persistence, the problem becomes a dynamic one, and the policymaker
must set i to minimize the discounted sum of the current and future one-period loss
functions. In addition to the tradeoff between current inflation and output, the
policymaker must also consider the effects of current actions on future realizations of
those variables.
Discretion
Optimal policy under discretion can be described by a decision rule of the form6 Further details, and a derivation of the policy rule, appear in Svensson (1997a).
7 An odd feature of Svensson’s original model is that over some range,
expectations of future inflation fall as the weight assigned to output fluctuations increases.
In the limiting case as l®¥, an adverse supply shock has no effect on expected inflation.
In this case, the inflation increase is sufficient to perfectly stabilize output, and with output
constant, there is no change in the state-contingent inflation bias. This curious result
would obviously not hold in a model characterized by persistence in the inflation process.
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The a coefficient, representing the time-invariant inflation bias, depends on the model’s
parameters just as it does in the static models of Barro-Gordon (1983) and King (1997),
i.e., increasing in y* and l. The –bet term represents the CB’s optimal response to the
supply shock; the CB will partially offset an adverse shock by increasing inflation. The
degree of accommodation, naturally, will be greater for larger values of l. Output
persistence tends to increase these two terms whatever the relative weight on inflation
goals. The inflation bias, a, will be larger because a given inflation surprise affects
current and future output,; the degree of accommodation also will be larger with
persistence (an effect Svensson terms “stabilization bias”).6
More interesting from our standpoint is the “state-contingent” inflation bias
persistence introduces, embodied by the –cyt–1 term in the decision rule. All else equal, a
lower level of output increases the expected loss from the output term in the objective
function, which the CB will attempt to offset through increased inflation. The private
sector understands this, of course, and will come to expect the higher inflation. In the
end, inflation will be higher, but output will remain unaffected by policy.7 It is this
persistent effect of supply shocks on inflation that we intend to examine empirically in the
work that follows.8
The short-term (one-period) interest rate can be determined by equating aggregate
demand with aggregate supply:
In the presence of output persistence, the short-term rate will rise more than it would
otherwise (provided the stabilization bias is not too large).
The pure expectations hypothesis can then be used to determine the long-term
(two-period) interest rate as ½(i1,t +E ti1,t+1),
Again, the effect of the expected inflation term is to increase the response of the long-term
rate.
Conservatism
The behavior of a weight-conservative “Rogoffian” central banker is similar, except l in
the social welfare function is replaced with some l’ describing the CB’s preferences,
where l’<l. As shown by Rogoff, (1985) such a policymaker will respond suboptimally
to supply disturbances, while delivering a lower average rate of inflation. As in the case
of discretion, the state-contingent inflation bias resulting from supply shocks generates
persistence in the response of interest rates, although the magnitude is attenuated relative
to the discretion case.
An interesting limiting case of conservatism is an “inflation-only targeter” for
whom l’ = 0. As might be expected of a fanatic, this behavior generates highly
suboptimal outcomes. In this case, a = b = c = 0, and inflation will equal its target (zero)
in each period. The short-term interest rate will adjust to equate aggregate demand with
supply8 King’s interpretation of an inflation target is as a mechanism that allows the CB
to commit to a given (presumably zero) average rate of inflation (i.e., unconditional on e)
while allowing the CB to respond to realizations of the e disturbance. Svensson (1997)
shows how state-contingent linear inflation contracts and state-contingent inflation targets
with a weight-conservative central bank can be engineered to mimic the OSCR.
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rising sharply to prevent an adverse supply shock from affecting inflation. The response
of the long-term rate rise along with the short-term rate,
but the expected inflation effect will be absent.
OSCR
Let us say that the CB acquires some sort of a mechanism that allows it to commit to a
zero inflation rate. (In King (1997), that mechanism is an inflation target; we return to
this interpretation below.8) Since only inflation surprises affect output, the optimal policy,
it turns out, is one in which the conditional expectation of inflation is always equal to its
target, i.e., Et–1 pt = 0. Consequently, supply shocks will have no persistent effects on
inflation or monetary policy.
This result is derived formally in a dynamic model by Lockwood et al. (1995) and
Svensson (1997a): if the CB can credibly commit to such a rule, the optimal decision rule
takes the form
in which the time-variant inflation bias, a, disappears. More importantly, from our
standpoint, is the disappearance of the state-contingent inflation bias, –cyt–1, so that
Etpt+1 = 0. The reason for this is clear: since only “surprise” policy actions can affect9 This result is driven by the endogenous nature of output persistence. With a
serially uncorrelated but exogenous supply shock, the policy response under discretion and
the OSCR would be identical. The result also depends on the lack of persistence in the
inflation process.
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output, it doesn’t pay to respond to predictable output movements. Hence, an optimal rule
will ignore them, and revert to the inflation target after responding contemporaneously to
the shock. Empirically, this means adverse supply shocks won’t generate inflation premia
in long-term interest rates. After responding optimally by letting inflation rise for one
period, the CB is trusted to return inflation to its optimal level once the shock has passed.
The corresponding movements in short- and long-term interest rates would then be
given by
and
Besides the dependence on lagged y and the mean inflation bias, the OSCR and
discretionary regimes also differ in the size of the response to the e realization. Because
future values of the output gap are affected by current policy actions, there is a tendency
to respond more vigorously to shocks, resulting in a b that is larger in size than the b*
obtained under the OSCR.9
Summary
If inflation targeting is more than “just talk,” the response of central banks to
macroeconomic shocks clearly should differ across these regimes. In understanding the
way in which the responses differ, it is helpful to recognize the two mechanisms by which11
Regime short-term rate long-term rate spread
OSCR d–1(1–ab*)½ d–1(1+r)(1–ab*)– ½ d–1(1–r)(1–ab*)
Discretion d–1(1–ab+abc)½ ( d–1–c)(1+r)(1–ab)– ½ ( d–1–c)(1–r)(1–ab)
Inflation-only d–1 ½ d–1(1+r)– ½ d–1(1–r)
Table 1
Response of Interest Rates to Supply Shocks Under Alternative Policy Regimes
supply shocks affect interest rates. The first is the effect on the real interest rate resulting
from varying degrees of accommodation of the shock by the central bank; the second is
the expected inflation introduced by the state-contingent inflation bias. Table 1
summarizes the relative responses derived in this section of the short- and long-term
interest rates to an e realization. Comparing the response of central bank’s policy
instrument (captured in the short-term interest rate) across the three regimes yields the
following predictions about the behavior of short-term interest rates:
• The instrument rate response under “inflation-only” targeting is greater than that
under the OSCR. Expected inflation is zero in either case, but under the OSCR,
the CB will want to accommodate the shock to some extent, resulting in a smaller
rise (in the case of a negative e) in short-term rate.
• The response under “inflation-only” targeting is greater than that under discretion
(for c < 1). The same reasoning holds: the CB’s desired accommodation under
discretion outweighs the change in expected inflation.
• The response under discretion is comparable to that under the OSCR. The state-
contingent inflation bias implies higher expected inflation (in response to an
adverse shock), which implies a larger short-term rate response; stabilization bias
implies a smaller (more accommodative) short-term rate response. (In a static
model without output persistence, the response is the same under discretion and the
OSCR.)
The analogous predictions for the long-term rate are:
• The response under “inflation-only” targeting is greater than under the OSCR.
There is no state-contingent inflation bias in either case, but the larger real rate
response by the inflation-only targeter yields a larger increase in long-term rate.12
• The response of the “inflation-only” targeter may be greater or less than the
response under discretion, depending on whether the larger real rate effect for the
“inflation-only” targeter is greater or less than the discretionary CB’s state-
contingent inflation bias.
• The discretionary CB’s response is greater than the response under the OSCR
(provided the stabilization bias isn’t too large). The response of the short-term
interest rate is similar under the two regimes (smaller for the discretionary CB due
to the stabilization bias), but the lack of a state-contingent inflation bias under the
OSCR removes the inflation premium in the long rate.
2. Identifying Inflation Targeting with Institutional Changes
As noted in the introduction, there are several different ways of characterizing inflation
targeting which have been evoked. Each one of these characterizations can be grounded
to a greater or lesser degree in a portion of the extant monetary economics literature. To
enable rigorous comparison of these characterizations with each other, and with reality, we
map these characterizations to moves by a central bank between one and another of the
three types of central banker modelled above — the untrusted discretionary, the strictly-
targeting conservative, or the trusted OSCR-following. Some distinctions can be identified
by using variations in institutional frameworks between the inflation target adopting
central banks (e.g., only those inflation target adopting central banks with formal
punishments for failure to meet the targets can be said to switch from the untrusted
discretionary regime). With this unified framework, each interpretation of inflation
targeting should be associated with a shift in the behavior of (some of) the adopting
central banks in response to disturbances, as well as in the response of private-sector
inflation expectations to the central bank’s activities. Testing of those empirical predictions
is the subject of the following section.13
Inflation Targeting as Trust Building
This is the interpretation of King (1997), that inflation targeting allows the central bank to
(come close to) follow the optimal state contingent rule. By providing greater information
about its forecasts (and therefore about the nature of the disturbances it faces) and
accountability for meeting those forecasts, the central bank gains in the flexibility with
which it can respond to shocks. This interpretation is consistent with Mishkin and Posen
(1997) and Bernanke, et al (1999) on the practice of inflation targeting on two counts:
first, it explains the pattern of inflation targeting central banks being able to convince the
public that they can accommodate “one-time” inflationary shocks (e.g., the indirect tax rise
in Canada in 1991; the United Kingdom exit from the ERM in 1992) without raising
doubt about underlying counter-inflationary resolve; second, it justifies why all inflation
targeting central banks invest so many resources in Inflation Reports and other forms of
public information provision.
If this interpretation is correct, all three inflation targeters (New Zealand, Canada,
and the United Kingdom) examined here should be characterized by smaller movements in
inflation expectations (embodied in long-term interest-rates) when the central bank
deviates from the target due to unforeseen shocks than seen prior to announcement of
inflation targets. This should hold whether the central bank is moving from a more
conservative but less publicly explicit regime, a more strictly rule based regime (such as
membership in a fixed exchange rate system), or a soft-on-inflation discretionary regime.
In either of the first two of these shifts to inflation targets, there should also be an
increase in the accommodation of shocks by the central bank. Thus, if one believes the
public distinguished between the mere appointment of conservative central bank governors
prior to the adoption of inflation targets in Canada and New Zealand and the full-scale14
implementation of transparent central bank talk, this increased accommodation of shocks
should characterize either all three central banks, not just the ERM-exiting United
Kingdom.
Inflation Targeting as Chatty Conservatism
This is an interpretation widespread among inflation targeting skeptics. Worldwide, there
is evidence of central banks becoming more conservative with respect to inflation goals.
This could be the result of intellectual commitment to the primacy of the price stability
goal as the forward march of progress knowledge continues, of the pressures of
internationally integrated capital markets, or of a general desire to be like the fashionable
central bankers of the day. The institutional aspects of inflation targeting dedicated to
transparency should then be seen as mere window dressing or as political concessions
necessary for central bankers to maintain this desired shift — either way, the act of
central banks talking about their inflation forecasts and publishing detailed reports is a side
show.
This interpretation fits nicely with the fact that, in both Canada and New Zealand,
the central banks expressed explicit commitment to a primary goal of price stability prior
to the announcement of inflation targets (Bank of Canada Governor Crow’s “Hansen
Lecture” of 1988; the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 in New Zealand), while the United
Kingdom had joined the ERM in 1990, and all three of these commitments followed years
of frustration and disappointment with (what were perceived as) looser monetary
strategies. Of course, this begs the question of why these central banks went on to
explicitly announce inflation targets even after the declarations of the primacy of the price
stability goal. In any event, were this the proper interpretation, the central banks would be15
moving in the direction of greater conservatism, meaning less accommodative flexibility in
response to disturbances. From this interpretation of inflation targeting, because it
represents a move from away from weak discretion, the response of inflation expectations
to whatever accommodation of shocks made, however, should decline.
Inflation Targeting as Inflation-Only Targeting
Some would hold that inflation targeting is actually “inflation-only targeting” (to use
Ball’s (1996) phrase), where inflation targeting literally means that the central bank only
takes its inflation goal into account when setting policy. Given the tenor of some
proposals in the United States Congress in the 1990s (before it apparently adopted the
opinion that current Federal Reserve policy could not be improved upon), and Galbraith’s
(1999) characterization of inflation targeting as a sign of inflation obsession (without any
regard for transparency), this view is shared by some inflation targeting advocates and
opponents. Obviously, as the limiting case of anti-inflationary conservatism, inflation-only
targeting predicts (when modelled) a shift to near-total inflexibility of monetary policy in
response to shocks with far from optimal results.
Rhetoric aside, however, there is little institutional or historical evidence for such
an interpretation of the behavior of most central banks publicly announcing inflation
targets in the 1990s. As documented in Bernanke, et. al. (1999), the inflation targeting
central banks of Australia, Canada, Israel, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (as
well as their monetary targeting precursors in Germany and Switzerland) have, at a
minimum, displayed gradualism in their responses to inflationary pressures out of concern
for real-side or international goals, and have by institutional design actively pursued other
short-run objectives besides price stability (e.g., the Bundesbank’s resetting of their10 Friedman and Kuttner (1996) took on the dangerous implications of just such a
rule-like policy regime as a warning against inflation targeting in the spirit of then-current
congressional proposals for the Federal Reserve.
11 Amongst inflation targeters, the United Kingdom and Australia have emphasized
point targets and exchange rate flexibility, while Canada and New Zealand have adopted
MCIs and strict target ranges. See the discussion of these operational issues in Laubach
and Posen (1997) and Mishkin and Posen (1997).
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“unavoidable rate of price increase” in 1980 following the 1979 oil-shock; the Bank of
Canada’s gradual disinflation from 1991, and its loosening response when inflation fell
faster than expected; the Bank of England’s decision to exclude the first-round effects of
interest-rate increases from their target-series RPIX).
Nevertheless, it is more than a straw man or a test of the literalness of language to
examine the case of what King (1997) calls an “inflation nutter.” Even if the central bank
in question were to have a typically mixed-goal perspective, a la Bernanke and Mishkin
(1992), an inflation target designed to be very strict for reasons of accountability could
still mimic the nutter with significant costs.10 When almost all inflation-targets have
central values only a small amount over the measurement bias in price indices, and those
targets with ranges are much narrower than what simulations would indicate are
confidence intervals for inflation control, it is plausible that these targets strictly
interpreted would constitute something close to inflation-only targeting.
This divides inflation targeting regimes between those central banks which commit
to a point-target (and the inherent flexibility of such) and those which announce strict
ranges, as well as a division between those which take the exchange rate into account in a
discretionary manner and those which adopt monetary conditions indices predetermining
the response to exchange rate movements.11 The trust-building OSCR interpretation which
sees inflation targeting as an investment in transparency to increase flexibility is obviously12 See Bernanke, et al (1998), Chapter 5, for details.
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at odds with the view that inflation-nutters get in through the back door of target design.
What is key is that in practice it is easy to imagine the adoption of an inflation targeting
regime which combines these motivations, perhaps through mistake or perhaps through
political compromise. Empirically, as discussed in the next section, this would make
inflation targeting look like an increase in conservatism as well as an increase in trust (and
its welfare benefits would depend on how far towards the OSCR or the inflation nutter the
regime was pushed).
Inflation Targeting as Strict Contracting
According to some interpretations of the models of Walsh (1995) and Persson and
Tabellini (1993) of optimal inflation contracts for central bankers, inflation targets can
serve as such a contract, but require an explicit punishment mechanism for the central
banker’s failure to meet the target. This is, of course, embodied in the Reserve Bank Act
of 1989 and the “Policy Targets Agreements” in New Zealand. Discussions in that
country leading up to target make reference to these sorts of ideas as part of the
justification for the design of their regime.12 One could claim that some aspects of the
United Kingdom inflation targeting framework also serve this purpose of making the
central bank contractually accountable. On our view, however, this interpretation stretches
the meaning of legal contracts beyond reasonable interpretation of the accountability of the
U.K.’s framework, which is what such interpreters of the pre-independence Bank of
England would have to argue given the absence of any more formal contracting and
punishment mechanism in their inflation targeting framework (as they would with regard
to the still legally far from independent Bank of Canada).18
If formal legal accountability for monetary policy actions with the possibility of
punishment of the central banker is required to achieve credibility rather than or in
addition to general talk to the public, then only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand should
show behavior mimicking the OSCR upon adopting inflation targets. This interpretation is
akin to the more realistic review of the inflation nutter as a central banker constrained by
inflation targets, but like the OSCR emphasizes the relationship with authority rather the
choice of goal. Alternatively, if a transparent record of targets, forecasts, and success in
meeting them alone is sufficient to build central bankers’ credibility, then we are back to
the first interpretation of inflation targeting as trust building, and much of the extra
apparatus in New Zealand is unnecessary. If, as seen in the RBNZ’s response to minor
broaches of the target ceiling during 1996, these extra obligations force the RBNZ to a
more strict conservatism, that central bank will display less flexibility in response to
shocks than the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada which mimic the OSCR without
a formal contract.
Inflation Targeting as Cheap Talk of the Weak
An even more skeptical interpretation of inflation targeting than the preceding views is
that those central banks which can credibly commit to low inflation do so, and those who
cannot, talk about so doing. Central banks which adopt inflation targeting are those banks
which have run out of alternatives because they cannot adhere to fixed exchange rate
commitments, monetary targeting, or other rule-like behavior. To preserve some veneer of
credibility, they talk. A theoretical grounding for this view is given in Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986) and Garfinkel and Oh (1995). In Garfinkel and Oh (1995) and Faust and
Svensson (1998), the central bank suffers from a two-fold credibility problem: the bias13 We are grateful to Michelle Garfinkel for an extended elucidation of these
models, but we remain responsible for this interpretation and any errors herein.
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from the possibility of discretionary surprise, and the existence of private information
regarding disturbances known to the central bank. Here, the cheap talk of the central bank
will have no meaning unless the central bank’s hands are tied (talk alone cannot get the
central bank to the OSCR).13 In fact, talking about goals and forecasts is a sign of
weakness.
While a seemingly robust theoretical result about cheap talk, identifying these
models with actual developments in central banking is somewhat problematic. This
interpretation of inflation targeting seems to make sense only for the United Kingdom, if
one were to interpret the exit from the ERM as a sign of weakness. (Sweden, another
inflation targeted not analyzed here, could be characterized in the same way.) It is more
difficult to imagine what made either the Bank of Canada or the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand “weaker”, in terms of the credibility of their commitments to price stability, at the
start of the 1990s than at their already less than credible starting point of the mid-1980s.
Yet, as a useful variant on the null hypothesis that inflation targeting made no
difference to central bank behavior — and a reminder that not too long ago theoretical
research seemed to conclude that the sort of efforts at public information and trust
building by central banks advocated in Bernanke, et al (1999) were doomed to failure —
this possibility must be considered. Inflation targeting under this interpretation is a move
towards greater discretion due to lack of credibility, and so inflation target adopting
central banks should greater flexibility with higher costs in the form of rises in inflation14In reality, it is possible to have both an increase in the degree of conservatism
and transparency with the adoption of inflation targets. In fact, some political
considerations might make these go together. We return to this point in the discussion of
our empirical results below.
15 Going outside of the model in section 1 above, central banks may choose to
announce inflation targets following a favorable inflation shock. See Mishkin and Posen
(1997) and Almeida and Goodhart (1998) for evidence of this pattern.
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expectations when shocks occur. This could apply to just the exchange-rate commitment
dropping United Kingdom, or to all three central banks considered here.14
3. The effects of inflation targets in practice
Having set out a strategy of identification for the effects of inflation targets, we now turn
to implementing that strategy econometrically. Our empirical approach emphasizes shifts
in the behavior of central banks, and of interest rate expectations. An obvious but
misleading alternative strategy for identifying the relationship between inflation targeting
and central bank behavior is to compare the average rate of inflation pre- and post-target.
Even if factors external to the monetary regime are controlled for, the discussion of the
previous two sections indicates that this alone provides little useful information. A lower
rate of inflation could result merely from a reduction in the target inflation rate, p*,
perhaps associated with a worldwide reduction in average inflation levels; observed lower
inflation rates post-target could equally be associated with an increase in conservatism
(i.e., a smaller weight on output in the central bank’s objective function) or with a
monetary policy that achieves the OSCR15.
A second approach to see whether inflation expectations are consistent with the
central bank’s stated inflation target, as in Johnson (1997) and Svensson (1996). While
this provides more direct evidence about credibility than inflation levels per se, it still does16 A related approach is to assess whether inflation targeting reduces the “sacrifice
ratio,” so that a given reduction in inflation will exact a smaller cost in terms of
employment and output. This approach requires additional assumptions about the
responsiveness of labor markets to variations in monetary regimes which are largely
unsupported for low inflation countries (see Posen[1998]), and which no inflation-target
adopting central bank expected to occur over the short lifespans of those regimes to date
(see Bernanke, et al [1999]). In the model discussed above, however, the structural
parameter describing the output-inflation tradeoff doesn’t change when a new policy
regime is adopted. Hutchison and Walsh (1998) give an alternative view on the New
Zealand experience.
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not distinguish between the varying interpretations of the regime. As discussed in section
2, despite their differences in response to shocks, on this measure the inflation-only
targeting and the OSCR regimes are indistinguishable, since inflation expectations will
converge to the central bank’s inflation target in either case.16
Instead, we look for differences in this behavior in the time-series properties of
inflation, and in the response of interest rates to inflation shocks before and after target
adoption, matched up with the predictions of the previous section. Rather than just look at
the inflation level, therefore, we disentangle the policy response to inflation, and the
expectations about that policy response. Our goals are twofold. The first is to establish
whether inflation targeting has, in fact, reduced the inflation bias problem in adopting
countries or if it merely represents “cheap talk.” The second is to see whether that
outcome was achieved through the adoption of more conservative preferences by the
central bank — becoming an “inflation-only targeter” in the limiting case — or through
additional efforts at transparency allowing a policy that resembles the OSCR.
To test the null hypothesis that inflation targeting merely represents cheap talk, we
draw on a key insight of the model discussed in section 1: namely, that inflation targeting,
whether achieved through an increase in conservatism, or in transparency, if successful
will lead to Et pt+1 = constant = p*. That is, there will be no persistence in inflation;17 This is similar to the approach taken by Ireland (1998) in testing whether the
time consistency problem can account for the behavior of U.S. inflation. In the context of
the Barro-Gordon (1983) model, he shows that a unit root in the natural rate of
unemployment makes inflation I(1) and cointegrated with the unemployment rate. The
mechanism is exactly the same as that described here: a persistent supply shock has
similarly persistent effects on the inflation bias. Though it must be noted that this is a
joint hypothesis, the fact is if the time-inconsistency problem is irrelevant for inflation,
then either the driving force for inflation targeting is gone or expectations do not matter.
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higher-than-expected inflation at time t will have no implications for inflation in period
t+1 and beyond. By contrast, if the central bank’s behavior is governed by unchecked
discretion, then an unfavorable shock at time t will increase inflation in subsequent periods
by virtue of the state-contingent inflation bias. While these are limiting cases, a natural
test of this null hypothesis, therefore, is to see whether inflation persistence falls after the
adoption of an inflation target.17
While a decrease in the degree of inflation persistence post target adoption is
consistent with reduction in the state-contingent inflation bias, and therefore the rejection
of the cheap talk interpretation, such a reduction says nothing about which policy —
conservatism or transparency — was used to achieve that outcome. To distinguish
between these two cases, we rely on the model’s implications regarding the policy
response to inflation, and the response of expectations to that policy. A shift towards
more conservative preferences ought to be associated with a larger weight on the inflation
term, and a smaller weight on employment, and should alter expectations regardless of the
extent of efforts at communication. By contrast, an increase in trust of the central bank
(as in the OSCR) does not require a change in preferences, but will induce a change in the
response to central bank policy moves to the extent that communication is effective.
One way to go after the question of conservatism versus transparency is to see
whether the adoption of inflation targets is accompanied by a change in the relative18 Obviously, no inflation targeting policy could be expected to completely
eliminate predictable inflation fluctuations. Nonetheless, a reduction in inflation
predictability will exacerbate the finite-sample problems associated with instrumental
variables estimators. See Staiger and Stock (1997).
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weights on employment and inflation in a Taylor-style reaction function. Leaving aside
for the moment the possibility of a movement towards both greater conservatism and
greater trust at once, the reduction in inflation persistence resulting from inflation targeting
creates a potential problem with this approach. If the policy were perfectly successful,
then inflation would be perfectly unforecastable; the policy instrument would be
manipulated in such a way as to keep expected future inflation constant. This is
essentially the empirical counterpart to the degeneracy problem identified by Bernanke and
Woodford (1998).18 Lagged inflation would provide no information about the future, nor
would any other variable dated t or earlier.
In terms of estimation, this property undercuts the use of lagged inflation as a
proxy for future inflation, and also subverts the more sophisticated instrumental variable
approach of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998). In this situation, tests based on an
estimated reaction function would reveal little to distinguish inflation-only targeting from
the OSCR. Given the reality that any monetary regime short of a currency board, not
even the Bundesbank in the 1970s or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in the 1990s, can
be characterized as truly inflation-only targeting, and that trust even after an educational
transparency effort is likely to be incomplete, estimated reaction functions will still be
informative in real-world cases of inflation targeting.
In any event, our third test, examining the response of monetary policy to inflation
surprises, addresses this problem as well as bringing in the behavior of inflation
expectations. Inflation’s unforecastability is not an issue: even though expected inflation24
is constant under an inflation target, the central bank will respond to unexpected changes
in the inflation rate in such a way as to maintain expectations at or returning to target
levels. Furthermore, as discussed earlier in section 1, the size of the policy response
provides some information on whether the central bank’s behavior is better described by
an inflation-only or an OSCR regime.
To be more explicit, as our first step towards characterizing the central banks’
behavior, we examine estimates of a simple Taylor-style monetary policy reaction
function. The operating instrument is assumed to be the short-term (overnight, in the case
of the U.K.) interest rate, whose target level is a simple function of the inflation and
unemployment “gaps”:
where p* is the central bank’s inflation target, Etpk
t+k is expected future inflation over
some horizon k, ut is the unemployment rate, and u* is its target. As in Clarida et al.
(1998), a partial-adjustment specification is used to capture central banks’ tendency to
smooth interest rates,
Average inflation rate over the preceding six months, p6
t, is used as a proxy for expected
future inflation. Although lagged inflation is a poor proxy for inflation expectations under
a policy of inflation targets, this approach sidesteps the statistical problems associated with
instrumental-variables estimation when the fit of the first-stage regression is poor.
The two equations can then be combined to yield the following regression equation
which can be estimated using OLS:19 Consensus forecasts of inflation are available for many countries, but they are
reported as monthly forecasts of current-year and coming-year average inflation. This
structure renders the extraction of k-period-ahead inflation forecasts impossible without
additional assumptions. Other measures, such as the nominal to index-linked gilt spread
for the U.K., are not available for all the countries under consideration.
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The target inflation and unemployment rates are subsumed into the constant term, while
the b1 and b2 coefficients can be interpreted as (1–r)b and (1–r)g, respectively.
Our third test concerns the interest rate response to inflation surprises. The
regressions used for this analysis are of the form:
where r now represents either the short-term or the bond rate, p3
t+3 is the average inflation
rate over the next three months, and Etpk
t+3 is its expectation as of time t. In other words,
the change in the interest rate over three months is regressed on the unexpected change in
inflation over the same horizon. A three-month horizon was chosen on the grounds that
month-to-month changes in inflation are dominated by “noise” that doesn’t elicit reactions
from either the central bank or the bond market. To account for possible changes in the
response of interest rates, an augmented version of this equation is estimated in which the
coefficients are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of the
inflation target.
Expected inflation is not observable, of course, so forecasts from simple statistical
models are used instead.19 One set of results (denoted “AR” in the Tables) uses forecasts
from a regression of inflation on lagged inflation and unemployment, consistent with the
simple inflation models in the first tests. An alternative set of results (denoted “YC” in
the tables) uses a yield curve approach, regressing inflation on lagged inflation, the20 In New Zealand, the onslaught of liberalization began in 1984, and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand Act was passed in 1989, almost two years prior to the adoption of
inflation targeting. In Canada, the ongoing discussion of economic policy has focussed on
the apparent absence of structural change, especially in labor markets. In the United
Kingdom, Thatcherite policies were pursued for over a decade prior to the announcement
of inflation targets in October 1992.
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overnight rate, and the 10-year government bond rate. The overlapping nature of the data
introduces an MA(2) error structure, however, so a Newey-West correction is used in the
computation of the standard errors.
Naturally, implicit in all these — or any — comparisons of central bank behavior
and economic outcomes across regimes is the assumption that all other structural
parameters remain constant across the two periods. While so baldly stated, this is not an
especially attractive assumption, its implications are of questionable relevance for the
sample of inflation targeters in question. There is good reason to argue that the three
countries discussed here went through much of their reforms in non-monetary areas prior
to their adoption of inflation targeting in the 1990s20. Furthermore, there is no clear
econometric evidence that the changes in monetary policy generated any significant
structural change in fundamental macroeconomic relationships in these countries [Laubach
and Posen (1997b)].
United Kingdom
We turn first to the results for the United Kingdom, which adopted an inflation targeting
policy after exiting the ERM in September 1992. In terms of explicit intent and design,
the Bank of England’s framework comes closest to the model of using transparency to
achieve the OSCR [see King (1997) and Bernanke, et al (1999), ch. 7]. On the face of it,
the U.K.’s adoption of an inflation target would appear to be clearly untinged by a21 Unusual inflation volatility which characterized this period — including one
month in which the annualized rate exceeded 20 percent — is another reason to exclude
the months leading up to the ERM. The results are qualitatively similar if this period is
included, however.
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movement towards increased anti-inflationary conservatism; if anything, the unwillingness
to remain in ERM and sacrifice domestic real-side goals for the sake of a strong pound
and price stability would seem to be a sharp break towards OSCR-like discretion. Also,
unlike in Canada and New Zealand, changes in the Bank’s mandate, independence, and
governor all took place after inflation target adoption. Thus, the United Kingdom
experience should be the clearest candidate inflation targeting regime to look like the
“trust-building” interpretation, if one will. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 2
above, if any of the three targeters could be interpreted to be replacing an anti-inflationary
commitment with cheap talk, it would also be the forcibly devaluing United Kingdom.
The experience under an inflation target is compared with the period from 1984
through 1989. The two years in which Britain participated in the ERM, and the eight
months leading up to it, are excluded from the analysis on the grounds that the period
represents a third policy regime.21 As with all three inflation targeters examined here, the
average rate of inflation is indeed lower during the targeting period: 2.7 percent, compared
with 5.2 percent for the 1984–9 period.
Table 2 reports measures of inflation persistence, and changes in its behavior
between the two subsamples. These, and subsequent, results are based on monthly data,
and inflation is calculated from seasonally-adjusted RPIX. One simple measure of
persistence is the sample autocorrelations, reported in panel A of Table 2. In the 1984–89
period, British inflation exhibited a high degree of serial correlation, with a first-order22 Strictly interpreted, the model in section 3 implies a positive relationship
between inflation and the unemployment rate, since adverse supply shocks would reduce
output and increase the inflation bias. The observed negative correlation between
unemployment and inflation could be captured by adding demand shocks to the model.
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autocorrelation coefficient of 0.45. This changes markedly with the adoption of an
inflation target: over the 1992–97 subsample, the autocorrelations are all close to zero.
This finding is confirmed in the time-series regressions of inflation on lagged
inflation and unemployment reported in panels B and C.22 In panel B, the regressions are
run separately on pre- and post-target subsamples separately. Over the earlier period, the
coefficients on the first two lags of inflation are positive and significantly different from
zero at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels; the coefficient on lagged unemployment is also highly
significant, and negative. In addition, with an R2 of 0.32, inflation fluctuations are
relatively predictable. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for first- and fourth-order
serial correlation, and for the inclusion of a third lagged inflation term, are all
insignificant.
This pattern changes after the adoption of inflation targets. The lagged inflation
term is not statistically significant, and the coefficient on the unemployment rate, while
still negative, is significant at only the 0.10 level. (The specification again passes the
diagnostic tests for serially correlated residuals and an omitted second lag on inflation.)
The drop in the R2 is from 0.32 to 0.06 shows that inflation is now much less predictable
— consistent with successful inflation targeting. There is, therefore, no evidence that in
the U.K. in the 1990s “cheap talk” replaced the discipline imposed by the ERM.
Panel C of Table 2 reports formal statistical tests for parameter constancy from a
regression in which the independent variables are interacted with a dummy variable that
takes on the value of one beginning in October 1992. The results confirm the reduction in29
inflation persistence identified above: the coefficient on the second lag of inflation falls by
a statistically significant 0.38 with the adoption of the inflation target.
Table 3 reports an estimate of the reaction function allowing the b1 and b2
coefficients to change with the adoption of the inflation target. (The equation also
includes a time-varying constant, which is not reported.) Although there is some weak
evidence for shifts in the coefficients, for the reasons discussed above, the interpretation of
these changes requires some discussion. The most noticeable change between the
subsamples is in the coefficient on inflation, which falls to essentially zero from a highly
significant 0.16 (which is consistent with b=0.62, a positive but less than one-for-one
response of the target overnight rate to inflation). This would be consistent with a move
towards the OSCR, and certainly opposite from a move towards greater conservatism.
The post-target coefficient is estimated very imprecisely, however, so the difference
in the two coefficients is not statistically significant. The zero coefficient may indicate a
reduced weight on inflation, but it also may simply reflect the fact that lagged inflation
has become less informative about future inflation, as demonstrated earlier. At the same
time, there was a slight increase in the weight on unemployment. Neither unemployment
coefficient is statistically significant, however; nor is its change between subsamples.
Results of our third test for the U.K., concerning the interest rate response to
inflation surprises, are somewhat sharper, and appear consistent with a shift from a
discretionary policy regime to one approximating the OSCR. The results show that prior
to the adoption of the inflation target, both short-term and long-term interest rates rose
sharply in response to inflation surprises: a one percentage point surprise increase in
inflation is associated with an increase in the short-term rate of over 25 basis points, and
an increase in the long rate of 8–12 basis points (depending on the inflation model).23 These figures, and the results which follow, are based on an inflation measure
obtained from the Bank of Canada that removes the effects of changes in the Goods and
Services Tax (GST).
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Considered in isolation, the size of the interest rate response prior to inflation target
adoption is difficult to interpret. Inflation shocks elicit a contractionary policy response
regardless of policy regime (including discretion). Similarly, the rise in bond rates may
reflect an increase in inflation expectations (consistent with a “weak” central bank), or it
may embody higher expected real short-term rates (consistent with a “conservative” central
bank).
It is the comparison between the pre- and post-target adoption interest rate
responses that is most revealing. The adoption of an inflation target appears to have
attenuated the response of both short- and long-term rates: only 7–8 basis points on the
short end, and a negative 3–5 basis points at the long end. Although none of these
estimates is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, the difference in the short-rate
response pre- versus post- is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, and at the 0.05 level
for the bond rate. This pattern is consistent with the successful implementation of the
OSCR policy in place of untrusted or untransparent discretion: the policy response to
inflation shocks is mild, yet there is no “inflation scare” à la Goodfriend (1993) to send
long-term rates climbing. The decline in aggressiveness of interest rate moves by the
Bank of England cannot be reconciled with an increase in conservatism.
Canada
Like the United Kingdom, inflation fell by about 2.5 percent (from 3.8 to 1.3 percent)
with the adoption of inflation targets in February 1991.23 Unlike what was seen in the
United Kingdom, however, there is little evidence of a change in the time-series properties24 Obviously, there are other factors — the exchange rate, commodity prices —
that might be related to Canadian inflation. But none of these omitted variables generate
serially correlated movements in inflation.
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of inflation post-adoption. As shown in Table 5, the inflation rate is, essentially, serially
uncorrelated both before and after this date. The autocorrelations reported in panel A are
all small, and those that are nonzero tend to be negative. This result is underscored in the
inflation regression reported in panel B, where the coefficients on lagged output and
inflation are small and statistically insignificant in both subsamples. Diagnostic LM tests
show no evidence of higher serial correlation, and the R2s from the two regressions are
0.01 and 0.04, respectively. Apparently, nothing forecasts Canadian inflation — a finding
consistent with successful inflation targeting and inconsistent with inflation targeting as
cheap talk.24 This could be dated to the appointment of Governor John Crow at the Bank
of Canada, or to his Hansen Lecture of 1988 declaring price stability to be the sole long-
run goal of Canadian monetary policy [see Mishkin and Posen (1997)].
The question remains, however, as to whether the Bank of Canada achieved this
outcome through a policy of increased conservatism, possibly approaching “inflation-only”
targeting as seen in Canada’s dips into deflation, or through a policy that approximated the
OSCR by building transparency and trust. As expected, the estimated reaction function
reported in Table 6 sheds little light on this question. The coefficients on the six-month
average inflation rate are small and statistically insignificant — as are the coefficients on
the unemployment rate. Unfortunately, the response of interest rates to inflation surprises,
reported in Table 7, are also uninformative. No statistically significant relationship
between inflation surprises and interest rates are apparent in the data.
One plausible interpretation of this result is that in spite of the inflation target,
Canadian monetary policy has been focused on the exchange rate. Indeed, even after25 Examples include a 300 basis point increase in early 1986, a 270 basis point
spanning late 1992 and early 1993 — both rapidly reversed — and, most recently, the 100
basis point increase in September 1998.
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February 1991, the Canadian overnight rate has been punctuated by sharp increases
without any apparent link to domestic inflation developments.25 This of course implies
some contrast between following of a monetary conditions index in practice, and the its
declared intent to maintain a steady tightness of monetary policy with respect to domestic
inflation as the exchange rate varies. Another factor is that swings in fiscal policy,
recently towards consolidation, have been the dominant determinant of macroeconomic
performance in Canada in recent years, as the Bank of Canada has itself argued to explain
the movements in long-term interest rates distinct from expected response to the adoption
of targets [see, e.g., Clinton (1998)].
New Zealand
The last case considered is that of New Zealand, which adopted inflation an inflation
target in January 1990. Monthly data on inflation and other variables are not available,
and the small number of quarterly observations in the pre- and post-target subsamples,
severely limits our ability to make precise inferences from the data.
As with the U.K. and Canada, average inflation has been lower post-target: 1.9
percent, versus 8.1 percent over the 1982 through 1990 period. And like the U.K., the
inflation rate exhibits much less persistence after the adoption of the inflation target, as
shown in Table 8. Prior to 1991, the autocorrelations, reported in panel A, show a great
deal of positive serial correlation; after 1991, they become small and generally negative.
In the inflation regression reported in panel B, the AR(1) coefficient drops from 0.64 pre-
target to essentially zero post-target, with no evidence residual correlation or an omitted33
lag on inflation. While this difference is striking and large enough to be economically
meaningful, it is statistically insignificant. The effects of the unemployment rate on
inflation are small and statistically insignificant in both subsamples.
The estimated reaction function coefficients reported in Table 9 are consistent with
a strong policy response to expected inflation both pre- and post-target. Before target
adoption, the coefficient on the inflation rate is a highly significant 0.50. (The two-quarter
average, p2
t, takes the place of the six-month average used in the monthly regressions
reported in the UK and Canadian cases). With a coefficient of 0.59 on the lagged short-
term rate, this implies a greater than one-for-one response of the interest rate to inflation.
While the size of the coefficient increases slightly post-target, the difference is not
statistically significant. Taken together with the results on persistence, this is consistent
with inflation targeting in New Zealand being a move away from discretion, but without a
noticeable increase in conservatism.
Pinning down the response of New Zealand interest rates to inflation surprises is
difficult, however, and the results emerging from this analysis, shown in Table 10, are
unclear. With inflation forecasts from the yield curve model (YC), the response of short-
term rates is much sharper post-target — but the estimated response is not statistically
significant, nor is it consistent with the results using the autoregressive (AR) forecasts.
Regardless of the inflation model used, bond rates tend to rise more steeply in the post-
target subsample, but again the estimates are not statistically significant. Because of this
imprecision, it is hard to characterize the policy response associated with New Zealand’s
adoption of an inflation target. One thing is clear, however, that the narrowness and
legalistic rigidity of the RBNZ’s inflation targeting framework does not seem to produce34
noticeably better results than the arguably more discretionary though still transparent
regimes in Canada and the United Kingdom.
4. Conclusions
It only exaggerates slightly to suggest that the widespread adoption of inflation targeting
has acted as something of a Rorschach test for observers of monetary regimes. Those
inclined to be skeptical of all but hard and fast monetary rules have viewed inflation
targeting as a form of political window-dressing for the capital market pressures towards
price stability, at best, and as merely cheap talk in lieu of credible policy at worst.
Alternatively, those who fear crusades for price stability and disregard of output
stabilization by central banks have seen in inflation targeting an open declaration of
obsession, that nothing but inflation matters. The central bankers adopting inflation
targeting regimes have themselves, however, given pride of place to the role of
transparency in the inflation targeting framework, both as an end unto itself and as a
means to greater accountability and flexibility. Even amongst the adopting central banks,
however, there has been some variation in the degree of explicit contracting (with
punishment) binding the central bank to strict pursuit of the inflation target.
In essence, the adoption of inflation targeting constitutes a test of whether central
bank communication can substitute for strict and simple rules. From the monetary
policymaker’s point-of-view, this is the practical aspect of the long-standing academic
“rules-versus-discretion” debate. In a world where both central bank information about
the economy, and control of it, is imperfect, what matters is the response to shocks —
debates over the appropriate target level of inflation or the relative weight of inflation
versus output goals may best be seen as long-term decisions that may be ideological, but26 This is consonant with the distinction between goal and instrument independence
in Debelle and Fischer (1994), as well as the distinction between constitutional and policy
phases of political economy in Dixit (1996).
27 See Laubach and Posen (1997) for statements by central bankers in Germany
and Switzerland characterizing their success as the management of such short-run
flexibility.
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tend to get settled for extended periods on the basis of relative intellectual consensus26.
The pedal truly comes to the metal when a central banker must deviate from her long-term
goal of price stability in the face of uncertain predictions or negative events27. That is
why our identification scheme for the effects of inflation targeting focusses precisely on
— and is able to differentiate the extant interpretations of inflation targeting on the basis
of — predictions for how talk by central bankers is or is not consistent with their behavior
in response to shocks.
The evidence presented in this paper would seem to indicate that talk by central
banks matters after all. Mapping the shifts between three types of monetary strategy
frameworks (untrusted discretionary, strictly conservative, trusted OSCR-following) to the
institutional practices of the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand after target adoption, allowed us to create predictions about central bank
behavior consistent with five different interpretations of inflation targeting. The
interpretation that inflation targeting simply represents cheap talk, and would be consistent
with a move towards greater discretion (and distrust) in the commitment to price stability,
is rejected for all three economies examined, including for the ERM-exiting United
Kingdom (the economy for which the strongest prima facie case for such an interpretation
could be made). The interpretation of inflation targeting as strict contracting, meaning
requiring an explicit legal arrangement of central bank reporting and accountability to
elected officials to make the transparent talk have real effect, also is rejected; the RBNZ,36
which exemplifies this approach, did not display noticeably more credibility or even
conservatism than the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, which were lacking some
of these aspects in their framework. Even talk which matters, however, need not be
interpreted too simplistically or as literally binding — there is no evidence that the sort of
“inflation only targeting” hoped for or feared by some who hear the words “inflation
targeting” was practiced by any of the three central banks considered here.
Whether talk alone is sufficient to earn the central bank enough trust to follow the
optimal state contingent rule, or whether the talk of inflation targeting represents a shift
towards greater conservatism short of inflation obsession, is less clear. There is some
evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting in the New Zealand case combined a shift
towards both greater conservatism and the OSCR; this is consistent with (though by no
means proof of) the case study interpretation of the New Zealand inflation targeting
framework in Bernanke, et al, (1999), Chapter 5, that the narrow target band and formal
reporting to government aspects in that framework made the RBNZ follow a more rules
based approach than strictly necessary. The Bank of England’s framework, which, as
described in King (1997) and documented in Bernanke, et al (1999), Chapter 7, goes to
great institutional lengths to rely on transparency instead of formal rules, thereby
providing OSCR-like short-run flexibility with long-run credibility, seems to produce
exactly the results we would have predicted for that interpretation. The lesson of the
Bank of Canada’s experience with inflation targeting, which is mixed on our results,
clearly not a move towards greater discretion but not clearly anything else seems to be a
reminder that whatever central banks do (talk or otherwise) cannot overcome large
movements in a country’s fiscal and international environments.37
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Table 2
Time Series Properties of the Inflation Rate
United Kingdom
A. Autocorrelations of inflation rate, pre- and post-target
Sample 123456
Pre-target 0.45 0.43 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.09
Post-target 0.10 –0.03 –0.06 0.01 –0.04 0.06
B. Inflation regression, estimated over pre- and post-target samples
LM tests
Coefficient on: serial correlation add’l
Sample const pt–1 pt–2 ut–1 R2 SE 1st ord 4th ord p term
Pre-target 6.80 0.23 0.25 –0.43 0.32 2.55 1.47 4.80 0.31
(2.98) (1.95) (2.16) (2.21) 0.22 0.31 0.31
Post-target 5.36 0.04 –0.33 0.06 2.34 2.43 3.32 0.91
(3.07) (0.28) (1.74) 0.12 0.50 0.51
C. Tests for structural change in the inflation regression
Coefficient on: Difference:
Pre-target Post-target Post – pre
pt–1 pt–2 ut–1 pt–1 pt–2 ut–1 pt–1 pt–2 ut–1
0.23 0.25 –0.43 0.04 –0.13 –0.38 –0.18 –0.38 0.04
(2.03) (2.25) (2.30) (0.29) (0.93) (1.85) (0.29) (2.15) (0.87)
Notes: Data are monthly. The pre-target sample runs from January 1984 through December 1989,
and the post-target sample runs from October 1992 through December 1997. (The period from
January 1990 through September 1992 is excluded.) Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. In
panel B, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for 1st order serial correlation and for the
omission of an additional lagged inflation term are distributed c2
1, and the statistics for 4th-order
serial correlation are c2
4; p-values appear below the test statistics. The results in panel C are based
in a regression of inflation on a constant, two lags of inflation, and one lag of the unemployment
rate; the independent variables are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the
adoption of an inflation target in October 1992.41
Table 3
Monetary Policy Reaction Function
United Kingdom
Coefficient on: Difference: LM test
Pre-target Post-target Post – pre for 1st order
rt–1 p6
t ut p6
t ut p6
t ut R2 SE serial corr.
0.74 0.16 –0.06 0.00 –0.09 –0.16 –0.03 0.92 3.01 0.06
(13.04) (2.11) (0.83) (0.03) (1.10) (0.32) (0.75) 0.80
Notes: Data are monthly. The pre-target sample runs from January 1984 through December 1989, and the post-target sample runs from October 1992
through December 1997. (The period from January 1990 through September 1992 is excluded.) Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The dependent
variable in the regression is the overnight rate. The regression also includes an intercept, which is not reported; all variables are interacted with a
dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of the inflation target in October 1992. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for 1st order serial
correlation is distributed c2
1; the p-values appears below the test statistic.42
Table 4
Response of Interest Rates to Unanticipated Inflation
United Kingdom
Coefficient on inflation surprise
Rate Model Pre- Post- Difference R2
Overnight AR 28.29 7.27 –21.02 0.150
(2.98) (1.29) (1.89)
YC 26.72 8.13 –18.59 0.141
(3.21) (1.46) (1.89)
Bond AR 8.50 –3.24 –11.75 0.054
(1.93) (1.37) (2.36)
YC 12.62 –5.80 –18.42 0.121
(2.81) (1.89) (3.35)
Notes: Data are monthly. The pre-target sample runs from January 1984 through December 1989,
and the post-target sample runs from October 1992 through December 1997. (The period from
January 1990 through September 1992 is excluded.) Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The
dependent variable in the regression is the three-month change in the interest rate. The
independent variables are a constant and a measure of the unanticipated three-month change in
inflation; both are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of the inflation
target in October 1992. For the results labeled AR, the unanticipated change is the residual from a
regression of the three-month-ahead rate of inflation on a constant, two lags of inflation and one
lag of unemployment. A similar procedure is used for the results labeled YC, but the regressors
are two lags each of inflation, the overnight rate, and the 10-year bond rate. Both regressions are
estimated separately over pre-target and post-target subsamples.43
Table 5
Time Series Properties of the Inflation Rate
Canada
A. Autocorrelations of inflation rate, pre- and post-target
Sample 123456
Pre-target 0.004 –0.117 –0.053 0.102 0.074 –0.249
Post-target –0.104 –0.019 –0.062 0.069 –0.007 –0.089
B. Inflation regression, estimated over pre- and post-target samples
LM tests
Coefficient on: serial correlation add’l
Sample const pt–1 ut–1 R2 SE 1st ord 4th ord p term
Pre-target 5.48 –0.01 –0.19 0.01 2.62 0.95 2.99 1.65
(2.70) (0.04) (0.87) 0.38 0.56 0.20
Post-target 2.28 –0.16 –0.05 0.04 1.92 0.02 5.35 0.14
(0.77) (1.78) (0.19) 0.90 0.25 0.71
C. Tests for structural change in the inflation regression
Coefficient on: Difference:
Pre-target Post-target Post – pre
pt–1 ut–1 pt–1 ut–1 pt–1 ut–1
–0.01 –0.19 –0.17 –0.05 –0.16 0.13
0.04 (0.99) (1.48) (0.16) (1.05) (0.34)
Notes: Data are monthly. The pre-target sample runs from January 1984 through January 1991,
and the post-target sample runs from February 1991 through December 1997. Numbers in
parenthesis are t-statistics. In panel B, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for 1st order
serial correlation and for the omission of an additional lagged inflation term are distributed c2
1,
and the statistics for 4th-order serial correlation are c2
4; p-values appear below the test statistics.
The results in panel C are based in a regression of inflation on a constant, one lag of inflation, and
one lag of the unemployment rate; the independent variables are interacted with a dummy variable
equal to one after the adoption of an inflation target in February 1991.44
Table 6
Monetary Policy Reaction Function
Canada
Coefficient on: Difference: LM test
Pre-target Post-target Post – pre for 1st order
rt–1 p6
t ut p6
t ut p6
t ut R2 SE serial corr.
0.92 0.10 –0.06 –0.10 –0.01 –0.20 0.05 0.95 0.66 3.28
(32.07) (1.15) (1.00) (1.10) (0.14) (1.62) (0.40) 0.07
Notes: Data are monthly. The pre-target sample runs from January 1984 through January 1991, and the post-target sample runs from February 1991
through December 1997. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The dependent variable in the regression is the overnight rate. The regression also
includes an intercept, which is not reported; all variables are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of the inflation targeti n
February 1991. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for 1st order serial correlation is distributed c2
1; the p-values appears below the test statistic.45
Table 7
Response of Interest Rates to Unanticipated Inflation
Canada
Coefficient on inflation surprise
Rate Model Pre- Post- Difference R2
Overnight AR –0.75 –4.54 –3.79 0.003
(0.15) (0.86) (0.51)
YC 0.29 –5.20 –5.49 0.003
(0.06) (0.99) (0.75)
Bond AR 2.95 0.70 –2.25 0.007
(0.87) (0.19) (0.45)
YC 3.03 1.45 –1.57 0.008
(0.89) (0.40) (0.32)
Notes: Data are monthly. The pre-target sample runs from January 1984 through January 1991,
and the post-target sample runs from February 1991 through December 1997. Numbers in
parenthesis are t-statistics. The dependent variable in the regression is the three-month change in
the interest rate. The independent variables are a constant and a measure of the unanticipated
three-month change in inflation; both are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the
adoption of the inflation target in February 1991. For the results labeled AR, the unanticipated
change is the residual from a regression of the three-month-ahead rate of inflation on a constant,
two lags of inflation and one lag of unemployment. A similar procedure is used for the results
labeled YC, but the regressors are two lags each of inflation, the overnight rate, and the 10-year
bond rate. Both regressions are estimated separately over pre-target and post-target subsamples.46
Table 8
Time Series Properties of the Inflation Rate
New Zealand
A. Autocorrelations of inflation rate, pre- and post-target
Sample 1 2 3 4
Pre-target 0.65 0.32 0.13 –0.06
Post-target –0.19 –0.05 –0.26 0.09
B. Inflation regression, estimated over pre- and post-target samples
LM tests
Coefficient on: serial correlation add’l
Sample const pt–1 ut–1 R2 SE 1st ord 4th ord p term
Pre-target 4.27 0.64 –0.29 0.49 3.51 0.31 6.48 0.30
(1.04) (3.62) (0.48) 0.58 0.17 0.58
Post-target 2.24 –0.06 –0.02 0.01 0.85 0.76 5.61 0.04
(3.07) (0.35) (0.24) 0.38 0.23 0.85
C. Tests for structural change in the inflation regression
Coefficient on: Difference:
Pre-target Post-target Post – pre
pt–1 ut–1 pt–1 ut–1 pt–1 ut–1
0.64 –0.29 –0.06 –0.02 –0.70 0.27
(4.90) (0.66) (0.12) (0.08) (1.29) (0.52)
Notes: Data are quarterly. The pre-target sample runs from 1982Q1 through 1990Q4, and the post-
target sample runs from 1991Q1 through 1998Q2. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. In
panel B, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for 1st order serial correlation and for the
omission of an additional lagged inflation term are distributed c2
1, and the statistics for 4th-order
serial correlation are c2
4; p-values appear below the test statistics. The results in panel C are based
in a regression of inflation on a constant, one lag of inflation, and one lag of the unemployment
rate; the independent variables are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the
adoption of an inflation target in 1991Q1.47
Table 9
Monetary Policy Reaction Function
New Zealand
Coefficient on: Difference: LM test
Pre-target Post-target Post – pre for 1st order
rt–1 p2
t ut p2
t ut p2
t ut R2 SE serial corr.
0.59 0.50 0.58 0.65 –0.18 0.15 –0.75 0.86 2.05 2.75
(7.87) (5.86) 1.90 (0.93) (0.81) (0.22) (2.02) 0.10
Notes: Data are quarterly. The pre-target sample runs from 1982Q1 through 1990Q4, and the post-target sample runs from 1991Q1 through 1997Q4.
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The dependent variable in the regression is the RBNZ discount rate. The regression also includes an intercept,
which is not reported; all variables are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of the inflation target in 1991Q1. The Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) test statistics for 1st order serial correlation is distributed c2
1; the p-values appears below the test statistic.48
Table 10
Response of Interest Rates to Unanticipated Inflation
New Zealand
Coefficient on inflation surprise
Rate Model Pre- Post- Difference R2 DW
Discount AR 6.16 –7.51 –13.66 0.004 2.42
(0.47) (0.13) (0.24)
YC –2.40 28.29 30.70 0.004 2.24
(0.18) (0.44) 0.46
Bond AR 3.17 16.46 13.28 0.010 2.11
(0.46) (0.55) (0.43)
YC 6.20 38.91 32.71 0.044 2.19
(0.94) (1.27) (1.04)
Notes: Data are quarterly. The pre-target sample runs from 1982Q1 through 1990Q4, and the post-
target sample runs from 1991Q1 through 1997Q4. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The
dependent variable in the regression is the quarterly change in the interest rate. The independent
variables are a constant and a measure of the unanticipated one-quarter change in inflation; both
are interacted with a dummy variable equal to one after the adoption of the inflation target in
1991Q1. For the results labeled AR, the unanticipated change is the residual from a regression of
the three-month-ahead rate of inflation on a constant, one lag of inflation and one lag of
unemployment. A similar procedure is used for the results labeled YC, but the regressors are one
lag each of inflation, the discount rate, and the 10-year bond rate. Both regressions are estimated
separately over pre-target and post-target subsamples.49
Data appendix
United Kingdom
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is the source for all data series. Core
inflation is derived from the RPIX, and is seasonally adjusted using the X11 procedure.
Canada
All data, except the inflation rate, are from the BIS. The short-term interest rate is the
overnight interbank rate. The bond rate is the 10-year Government bond yield. Inflation
is derived from the CPI excluding indirect taxes, seasonally adjusted, obtained from the
Bank of Canada.
New Zealand
Interest rate data are from the BIS. The short rate is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(RBNZ) discount rate, and the bond rate is the yield on 10-year Government bonds.
Inflation and unemployment data were obtained from the RBNZ. Inflation is derived from
the CPI excluding credit services.